Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
LETTERS OF COMFORT REVISITED
H.S.B.C.
v. Jurong
A. Introduction
Since the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd
v. Malaysia Mining Corp. Bhd,
1
it would be understandable if the business community placed little or no reliance on letters of comfort save in the exceptional case where the terms evince an undeniably clear intention to create binding obligations. It might therefore seem somewhat surprising that an experienced and sophisticated institution should commence proceedings in the High Court of Singapore on the premise of a letter of awareness in Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd
v. Jurong Engineering Ltd.
2
This could plausibly be explained as the bank’s last-ditch attempt to salvage an ill-fated transaction. Yet perhaps underlying this facile explanation there also exists a tangible and sanguine expectation that some legal consequences should attach to assurances given by a parent company in support of its subsidiary’s obligations. And such expectation did not seem to have been quelled by the weight of authorities to the contrary.3
The reasoning and result in this case reiterate the pivotal role played by the concept of contractual intent
in the protection of parties’ expectations and provides us with a fresh opportunity to consider how such intent is to be ascertained.
1. [1989] 1 W.L.R. 379.
2. [2000] 2 S.L.R. 54.
3. See, e.g. Kleinwort Benson
[1989] 1 W.L.R. 379 (Eng.); Commonwealth Bank of Australia
v. TLI Management Pty Ltd
[1990] V.R. 510 (Aus.); Toronto-Dominion Bank
v. Leigh Instruments Ltd (Trustee of)
(1998) 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 117 (Can.); and Bank of New Zealand
v. Ginivan
[1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 178 (N.Z.).
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