Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE END OF THE EXCEPTION IN DUNLOP v. LAMBERT?
McAlpine
v. Panatown
The House of Lords in Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd
v. Panatown Ltd
1
considered a familiar problem. Where A contracts with B to improve the property of C, and A defaults, do either B or C have an action for substantial damages against A? A strict application of the law effectively gives neither an action. C lacks privity of contract with A; B has privity of contract, but is not considered to have suffered substantial damages. Thus, the party who has suffered damage has no privity of contract and the party who has privity of contract has suffered no damage. The result is that the claim for substantial damages disappears into some legal black hole.2
The legal background to Panatown
Rational legal systems ought not to have black holes. To a large extent, the potential creation of such a black hole can now be prevented by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.3
Prior to the 1999 Act, courts struggled to identify, or even create, an exception to the otherwise harsh operation of the law. Most of these exceptions were devices aimed at circumventing the doctrine of privity. In Panatown,
the House of Lords was concerned with the exception first identified in Dunlop
v. Lambert
.4
It held, as an exception to the general rule of damages, that in a contract for the carriage of goods by sea the consignor could recover substantial damages from the carrier where the consignor (but not the consignee) had privity of contract with the carrier. This result was allowed even though the goods were no longer owned by the consignor or at his risk. The consignor and the carrier had contemplated at the outset that title to the goods would pass before the contract of carriage was performed. The consignor is accountable to the consignee for the damages. The exception was reaffirmed in The Albazero
.5
The exception was further developed in two building cases,6
in one of which (St Martins)
the House of Lords extended the ambit of the exception to include a building contract. A contracted with B to construct buildings. When B subsequently transferred its property interest in the building site to C, B could enforce contractual rights against A on behalf of C. The majority decided the case on the basis of the “narrow ground”: the case
1. [2000] 3 W.L.R. 946.
2. GUS Property Management
v. Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd
1982 SC (H.L.) 157, 177, per
Lord Keith of Kinkel.
3. Panatown
preceeded the Act. The Act itself will not necessarily solve all privity problems. See C. MacMillan, “A Birthday Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999” (2000) 63 M.L.R. 721.
4. (1839) 6 Cl. & Fin. 600; 7 E.R. 824; (1839) Macl. & Rob. 663. The line of authority in which this exception was developed has been well discussed in the academic literature. See B. Coote, “Dunlop
v. Lambert:
the Search for a Rationale” (1998) 13 J.C.L. 91; N.Palmer and G.Tolhurst, “Compensatory and Extra-compensatory Damages: The Role of the ‘
The Albazero’
in Modern Damages Claims—Part I" (1997) 12 J.C.L. 1; Palmer and Tolhurst, “Part II” (1997) 12 J.C.L. 97.
5. [1977] A.C. 774. The House of Lords refused to apply the exception in the case.
6. Linden Gardens Trust Ltd
v. Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martins Property Corp. Ltd
v. Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd
[1994] 1 A.C. 85. The exception in Dunlop
v. Lambert
was applied by the Court of Appeal in Darlington B.C.
v. Wiltshier Northern Ltd
[1995] 1 W.L.R. 68 to include a situation in which ownership of the building was never transferred or intended to be transferred.
CASE AND COMMENT
339