Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK: UNJUST ENRICHMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
Garland
v. Consumers Gas
Writing in 2000,1
Lionel Smith noted that the Canadian law of unjust enrichment—which requires an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation, and an absence of juristic reason for the enrichment2
—was in a state of confusion over the definition of ‘‘absence of juristic reason’’. Was the concept to be taken literally, requiring plaintiffs to prove a negative? Or was the concept just an awkward formulation of the traditional English model, which requires plaintiffs to show a positive reason, such as mistake or duress, in order to reverse the transfer of wealth? As Smith and others had argued, the Canadian law was of two minds on the subject.3
With its decision in Garland
v. Consumers Gas Ltd
,4
the Supreme Court of Canada has ended the controversy by favouring the literal interpretation of the concept. In so doing, the court has joined the growing consensus positing ‘‘absence of legal ground’’ as the simplest and most coherent understanding of the unjust enrichment phenomenon.5
However, in what is becoming a typical style,6
the Supreme Court has largely eviscerated the integrity of this model of unjust enrichment through the addition of ad hoc
policy and fairness concerns.
The facts and judicial history
Consumers’ Gas Company Ltd, now known as Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc (‘‘Enbridge’’), is a regulated utility which provides natural gas throughout the province of Ontario. As a regulated utility, its rates and payment policies are governed by the Ontario Energy Board (the ‘‘OEB’’). As a result of the authorizing legislation,7
Enbridge cannot sell or charge for gas-related services except in accordance with rate orders issued by the OEB, although it was and is always open to Enbridge to suggest to the OEB alternative methods of meeting its revenue requirements. To encourage prompt payment, in 1975 the OEB authorized the application of a late payment penalty (the ‘‘LPP’’), calculated at 5% of the unpaid charges for that month. Gordon Garland was one of the many Enbridge
1. L. D. Smith, ‘‘The Mystery of ‘Juristic Reason’’’ (2000) 12 Supreme Ct L Rev (2d) 211.
2. See Pettkus
v. Becker
(1980) 117 DLR (3d) 257 (SCC); Peel (Regional Municipality)
v. Canada
(1992) 98 DLR (4th) 140 (SCC).
3. See, eg, Smith (2000) 12 Supreme Ct L Rev 211, 219 and M. McInnes, ‘‘The Canadian Principle of Unjust Enrichment: Comparative Insights into the Law of Restitution’’ (1999) 37 Alberta L Rev 1, 12–13.
4. [2004] SCC 25 (hereinafter ‘‘Garland
’’).
5. See, eg, R. Zimmerman, ‘‘Unjustified Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach’’ (1995) 15 OJLS 403, where he notes that the modern civil law is characterized by its adoption of the absence of legal ground approach to unjust enrichment and argues that this approach is to be preferred to that of the common law; accord: S. Meier, ‘‘Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds’’ in D. Johnston & R. Zimmerman, Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective
(Cambridge: CUP, 2002) 37. See also P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment
(Oxford: OUP, 2003), ch 5 where one of the originators of the unjust factor analysis, and one of the Commonwealth’s leading unjust enrichment scholars, converts to an absence of legal ground understanding in the face of the swaps cases. See also the recent speech of Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead in Criterion Properties Plc
v. Stratford UK Properties Llc
[2004] UKHL 28; [2004] 1 WLR 1846, which essentially employs an absence of legal ground analysis.
6. For recent examples of policy overwhelming principle, see Cooper
v. Hobart
(2001) 206 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC) and Bazley
v. Curry
(1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 (SCC).
7. Ontario Energy Board Act, RSO 1990, c O.13; Municipal Franchises Act, RSO 1990, c M.55.
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