These views were dicta only, but three years later they were to form an important part in the reasoning of the majority of the House of Lords in Renton v. Palmyra .3 The issue there involved a clause in a bill of lading permitting discharge at an alternative port in the event of a strike at the contractual discharge port. The bill of lading specified discharge at London but, due to a strike there, the cargo was discharged at Hamburg. Their Lordships held that the shipowners were entitled to rely on the clause and were not, therefore, liable for the costs of transhipping the cargo to London. The majority approved Devlin J’s dicta and classified the clause as one which defined the voyage undertaken by the carrier. As the carrier retained freedom of contract as to the scope of the contractual services it would undertake, there was no question of the clause falling foul of Art III, r 8. If such a clause operates by defining the scope of the carrier’s responsibilities, then it cannot amount to a ‘‘clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection with goods arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article or lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in these Rules’’.

Devlin J’s dicta are of obvious relevance to FIOST (‘‘free in, out, stowed and trimmed’’) clauses, which purport to allocate responsibility for loading, stowing and trimming to the shipper and for discharge to the receiver. Such a clause recently came before the House of Lords in The Jordan II .4 The case involved the carriage of a cargo of steel coils from Mumbai, India, to Motril, Spain. The cargo was alleged to have been damaged due to the manner of its stowage as well as due to the manner of its discharge.5

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