Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
Interpretation and mistake in contract law: “The fox knows many things … ”
Gerard McMeel *
The common law system has been built up over centuries based upon the collective results of countless real disputes. On occasion, judges in landmark cases have added something more, by identifying its underlying principles. On other occasions, this distillation of principle has been undertaken by writers attempting to impose some structure on the wilderness of single instances. The development of the common law may involve retrieving long-forgotten streams of authority, or re-interpreting existing concepts. The common law system has its distinctive modes of argumentation, a hierarchical (and traditionally gerontocratic) caste of practitioners, and the devotion of its community to rules of authority to determine conflict.1
Private law, despite 20th century reductionism and functionalism, remains perhaps the most characteristically common law part of the legal system.2
This paper will address just one aspect of common law, namely the relationship between contractual interpretation and the various doctrines which respond to mistakes in the bargaining process or in the resulting contract. It is clear that there is an intimate connection between the two. Indeed, construction was the matrix from which most modern mistake theory sprang. By the middle of the 20th century mistake appeared to have hardened into a distinct doctrine or perhaps doctrines, but at the end of the 20th century construction techniques re-surfaced. I want to address how this could be the case.
Isaiah Berlin was fond of quoting the aphorism of the Greek poet Archilochus that: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” In his view the metaphor could be said to “mark one of the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and it may be, human beings in general”.3
The distinction is between those who subscribe to a single grand vision (monists) and those who adhere to a view of the world made up of “hetereogeneous elements” (pluralists).4
It may serve as a useful tool of analysis for the world’s great thinkers in all disciplines, or at least is suggestive of a learned form of parlour game. For present purposes I merely wish to suggest that, whether
* Professor of Law, University of Bristol; Barrister, Guildhall Chambers, Bristol and Quadrant Chambers, London. This paper is based on my Inaugural Lecture at the University of Bristol delivered on 4 March 2004 and a lecture at Quadrant Chambers on 8 December 2004.
1. AWB Simpson, “The Common Law and Legal Theory”, in W Twining (ed), Legal Theory and Common Law
(1986), 8–26.
2. E Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law
(1995).
3. I Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox—An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History”, in H Hardy and R Hausheer (eds), The Proper Study of Mankind
—An Anthology of Essays
(1997; US edn, 1998), 436. See also the Introduction to the same volume by Noel Annan at xiv–xv
. Berlin also inspired the title and theme of the late American zoologist and polymath Stephen Jay Gould’s final volume, The Hedgehog, the Fox and the Magister’s Pox—Mending and Minding the Gap Between Science and the Humanities
(2003; paperback edn 2004), 1–8.
4. Berlin (supra
, fn 3).
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