Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
Termination as a response to unjust enrichment
Christopher Langley and Rebecca Loveridge *
The power to terminate a contract at law has traditionally been seen as a response to a breach of contract. This paper explores the nature of powers to terminate at law and those contained within the contract and argues that the power to terminate at law is never a response to a breach but responds to unjust enrichment: the holding of contractual rights is an enrichment at the expense of the other party which becomes unjust when the basis for their conferment fails. Recognising this enables a clear separation of the questions of termination and damages with important practical consequences including a more principled approach to the award of loss of bargain damages which resolves the inconsistency between Lombard North Central v Butterworths and Financings v Baldock. It also brings greater certainty for parties faced with a choice between exercising a power to terminate at law and an express contractual provision for termination.
I. INTRODUCTION
The question whether a contract can be terminated is a crucial one for commercial parties. In answering this question, the current approach is to look for a power at law following a repudiatory breach of the contract or an express contractual power contained in the contract. There are important practical differences between these two powers. The former
LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
66