Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
LIABILITY FOR LOSS CAUSED THROUGH RELIANCE ON AN INACCURATE ROUTE GUIDE
Martin Hogg*
Munro v Sturrock
The facts of the recent judgment of the Inner House of the Court of Session in Munro v Sturrock
1 raise interesting questions about the potential liability of the compiler of an inaccurate route guide for injuries to property and person suffered through reliance on the guide. Unfortunately, not only did the injured party fail to plead all of the bases in law which might potentially have grounded his claim, but both first instance and appeal judgments failed sufficiently to analyse the relevant issues of the claim as pled.
The facts were simple enough. The pursuer, Raymond Munro, was a relatively successful rally driver, having competed in rallies since about 1980. In 2004 he competed in a rally with his co-driver (not a party to the litigation), the latter’s task being to read out descriptions of approaching bends in the route in order to allow the pursuer to navigate these bends appropriately. In reading out the route descriptions, the co-driver relied upon a guide to the route compiled by the defender, William Sturrock (who traded as a compiler of such route guides under the name “Scotmaps”). Neither judgment at first instance nor on appeal makes it clear whether the maps were printed and published by a third party, or by the defender himself, but it seems likely that it was the defender who was printer and publisher as well as author, given the absence of any third-party publisher or printer as a co-defender as well as the small-scale nature of the defender’s business. The route guide in question, together with an accompanying DVD, had been purchased by the pursuer from the defender prior to the rally, for £100. During stage 6 of the rally, the co-driver, reading from the route guide, announced an approaching bend as being a 40-degree left-hand bend, to be taken on a tight line. In navigating this bend, the pursuer crashed the vehicle, causing damage to it and resulting, so he averred, in psychiatric injury to himself. He argued that the nature of the bend had been inaccurately described, and that it should have been described as being a 70-degree bend, not to be taken on a tight line. The misdescription of the bend was alleged by the pursuer to be the result of the defender’s negligence. The defender argued that the bend was not incorrectly described in the route guide, and denied any liability for the harm caused. A proof of the facts was held, at which expert witnesses gave evidence, and at the conclusion of which the judge at first instance (Lord Uist) held the nature of the bend not to have been misdescribed. He therefore dismissed the case against the defender.
Frustratingly, it is not made clear in the judgment at first instance whether the case against the defender was in contract or in delict (tort): because the pursuer purchased the route guide from the defender, either basis might conceivably have founded an allegation of negligence against the defender (albeit that delict is the more likely of the two, especially given judicial reference to delictual cases on the standard of care2). The judge also failed to decide whether the standard of care applicable was that of the ordinary person or of the skilled professional, holding that the finding that the bend was not misdescribed rendered such a decision unnecessary.
CASE AND COMMENT
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