Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
ONE-SIDED JURISDICTION CLAUSES: FRENCH FOLLY AND RUSSIAN MENACE
Adrian Briggs*
Banque Edmond de Rothschild v X
Suppose a contract—not a consumer contract,1 or anything like that—contains a provision which states that “disputes between Bank and Client shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Luxembourg, though Bank reserves the right to bring proceedings before the courts of the Client’s domicile, or before any other court which would have jurisdiction apart from this agreement”. This, more or less, was the unremarkable wording considered by the French courts in Soc Banque privée Edmond de Rothschild Europe v X.2 Such lopsided3 jurisdiction agreements are frequently found in financial contracts. They reflect not only the dominant bargaining position of the bank or other finance-provider, but also the practical truth that, when problems arise, maybe several years after the financing agreement was made, it may not be sensible to force litigation to take place in a court designated with jurisdiction a long time ago. English courts have never doubted that such agreements on jurisdiction are valid and work according to their terms, and that, where they designate the courts of a Member State, they are given effect, according to their terms, by the Brussels I Regulation, Art.23.
Late in 2012 four alarming things happened or came to light, which served only to undermine the legal certainty which agreements on jurisdiction are designed to secure. The first to be noticed in England was that the French Supreme Court, in five blank, unelaborated, lines of judgment, ruled that such an agreement on jurisdiction was null and void, by reason of its “potestative” character.4 The second was that the Supreme Court of Bulgaria (another Member State) was then reported to have come to a similar conclusion
* Professor of Private International Law, Oxford University; Barrister.
1. In the context of the Brussels I Regulation (Regulation (EC) 44/2001), and possibly elsewhere, laws limit the effect of dispute-resolution agreements in certain contracts made by consumers.
2. Cour de Cassation, 1st Civil Chamber, 26 September 2012.
3. Actually, in the case under review, this was not as lopsided as it may have appeared to the careless reader. As the bank was domiciled in Luxembourg, the effect of the jurisdiction agreement was that the client was entitled to sue the bank in the courts of its domicile or in the contractually-agreed court; and the bank was entitled to sue the client in the courts of her domicile or in the contractually-agreed court. If that was the sum and substance of the clause, it is hard to see that an allegation of lopsidedness, or unevenness, or “potestative character” (which is dealt with below) accords with the facts. The analysis in this Comment proceeds, therefore, on a hypothesis which may not be well founded.
4. “Potestative condition: a condition or term of a legal agreement that is completely within the power and control of one of the parties and that makes the agreement unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation” (source: Merriam-Webster online dictionary).
LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
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