Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE PROPER PURPOSE RULE
Hans Tjio*
Eclairs Group v JKX
The proper purpose rule “is the least discussed and least well understood of the fiduciary obligations affecting a director”.1 We were recently reminded by the UK Supreme Court in Eclairs Group Ltd v JKX Oil and Gas Plc
2 that the rule imposes different requirements on directors when contrasted with their duty to act bona fide in the interest of the company.3 There may, however, be a but-for causation requirement which protects directors where they would have come to the same conclusion had they only acted properly.
The relevant exercise of power here concerned the Companies Act 2006, s.793, which allows a listed company to require a person to confirm if he is “interested in the company’s shares”4 (as well as any agreements or arrangements under which another person is entitled to control the exercise of any rights conferred by the holding of those shares). Section 794 then empowers a court to restrict the exercise of rights attaching to those shares where the person interested in them fails to comply with a disclosure notice.
The issue in Eclairs was whether the board of JKX, an English company listed on the London Stock Exchange, had properly exercised its additional power (conferred by the company’s articles) in itself imposing voting and share transfer restrictions5 at an AGM on certain shareholders incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (Eclairs Group Ltd and Glengary Overseas Ltd) and the individuals behind them. Article 42 entitled the board to impose these restrictions pursuant to a s.793 notice, “where the board knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the information provided is false or materially incorrect”.6 JKX argued that its board should only be tested in the performance of its duties by whether its directors acted in the company’s best interest, even if the purpose of the power here was to compel disclosure (and not, as was the case with the majority of the board,7 simply to stop the shareholders from preventing some resolutions, which they firmly believed to be in JKX’s best interest, from being passed).
1. RC Nolan, “The Proper Purpose Doctrine and Company Directors”, in BAK Rider (ed.), The Realm of Company Law (Kluwer Law International, 1998), 1.
2. [2015] UKSC 71; [2015] Bus LR 1395 (“Eclairs”).
3. Cf S Fridman, “An Analysis of the Proper Purpose Rule” (1998) 10 Bond LR 164, who does not think that the proper purpose rule adds much to the duty that directors have to act in the best interest of the company.
4. Which, according to Lord Sumption in Eclairs, [39], is “very broadly defined”: see Companies Act 2006, ss 820–825.
5. The remaining power not to pay dividends was not exercised.
6. Mann J at first instance in Eclairs [2013] EWHC 2631 (Ch); [2014] 1 BCLC 202, [139–179], found that the board did have reasonable cause to believe that the responses were inaccurate. Article 42 supports the contractarian view of the company in that it provided a power to the company that exceeded that in the statute, which, unless stated otherwise, is enabling rather than mandatory.
7. Mann J, ibid, [200], thought that “they had in mind protecting the company full stop”. Referring to Mann J below, Briggs LJ, who dissented in the Court of Appeal, said that, “(h)e found that the purpose of maximising the prospects of passing the resolutions at the AGM was a separate and dominant purpose, not linked either to the extraction of the information… or to the protection of the company pending the provision of it”: Eclairs [2014] EWCA Civ 640; [2014] 4 All ER 463, [89].
Case and comment
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