Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT 1992 PUT TO THE TEST
The Berge Sisar
The Berge Sisar
1 provides unexpectedly soon a test of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, which replaces the Bills of Lading Act 1855 in transferring rights and liabilities with bills of lading and certain other documents, and in some form is operative in certain other common law jurisdictions also.
The scheme of the Act as regards bills of lading is (in oversimplified form) to transfer rights under bills of lading to all “lawful holders” (s. 2); but to make them liable only if they seek delivery of any of the goods (s. 3). This split between rights and liability was made to preserve the position of banks holding shipping documents as security, who would now rank as lawful holders in situations where they were not affected by the previous Act (the Bills of Lading Act 1855) at all. That Act operated on the basis of property in the goods, and banks were in general unaffected by it because they do not have (general) property in the goods represented by the documents.2 By the new Act they could rank as “lawful holders”: but they are only made liable on the contract of carriage if they seek delivery. This accords in general with the previous position. Though it did not have the property in the goods, a bank would often become liable where it actually sought delivery of the goods. In such a case it could be treated as party to a Brandt v. Liverpool contract,3 under which the carrier could in certain circumstances be regarded as impliedly agreeing for consideration to deliver on bill of lading terms. The new Act applies, of course, to other lawful holders, in particular buyers. Although the analogy should obviously not be pushed too far, the new Act can be said to create something like in effect a statutory contract of this type-freed, because of its statutory provenance, of difficulties of consideration which could affect the use of the common law device, and of other problems such as that of contractual intent.4
The acts which trigger off liability on the bill of lading are laid down by s. 3(l)(a) and (b) as taking or demanding delivery of any of the goods, or making a claim in respect of any of them under the contract of carriage (s. 3(1)(a) and (b)). “Taking” delivery is the obvious situation for a Brandt v. Liverpool contract, and it is not surprising that it is not required that delivery of all the goods be taken. “Demanding” must refer primarily to
1. Borealis A.B. v. Stargas Ltd (The Berge Sisar) [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1353; [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 475.
2. Sewell v. Burdick (1884) 10 App. Cas. 74.
3. See Brandt v. Liverpool, & c., S.N. Co. [1924] 1 K.B. 575, which has given its name to this type of implied contract, while by no means being the first case on it.
4. As to which see The Aramis
[1989] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 213.
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