The case evolved around a container which was put at the disposal of the exporter for an Atlantic voyage in the month of February. The ship was caught in a storm, the container’s side wall was ripped off and the cargo washed overboard and lost at sea. The insurance company indemnified the exporter and sued the carrier by subrogation. The defendant carrier sought to dismiss the claim, contending that it was entitled to avail itself of the defence of perils of the seas, within their meaning in the Hague Rules, Art. IV(2)(c). It was common ground that the container belonged to the carrier, and as such fell under the obligation of the carrier to exercise due diligence in making it seaworthy prior to the commencement of the voyage. The District Court rejected this contention and found that the container was in fact unfit for the particular voyage and its foreseeable inherent risks, and that the random inspection which was carried out by the carrier was inadequate under the circumstances, particularly as more than the specific container concerned fell apart under the impact of the waves.

Thus, the principal subject of contention remained the would-be defence of perils of the high seas, a defence which is closely connected with the question of seaworthiness. The carrier propounded that it was entitled to base itself on the defence of perils of the seas irrespective of the unseaworthiness issue. This contention was rejected by the court. Moreover, the court opined that, in order to uphold the defence of perils of the seas, the carrier is bound to prove an exceptional and unforeseeable event, or force of the elements of nature. In so holding, the court embraced the formulation of Professor William Tetley,2 that what was required was: