This fascinating volume contains a wealth of information and argument as well as theoretical analysis on multifarious aspects of International and Comparative Corporate Insolvency law. The book arises out of the proceedings of a conference held in Toronto in June 1993. This conference focused mainly but not exclusively on problems of reorganization of insolvent businesses and the search for more harmonious international insolvency rules. It attracted participants from many parts of the globe and included in their number were not only academics and legal and insolvency practitioners but also judges and government officials.

Among the interesting papers included in the volume is an article by Dan Prentice, Fidelis Oditah and Nick Segal “Administration: Part 11 of the Insolvency Act” which has already appeared in the pages of this Quarterly: [1994] LMCLQ 487. On the same theme is a paper by Harry Rajak. In it he describes a research project in which data concerning all companies placed in administration in England and Wales in the first four years of the regime has been collected and is being analysed. The conclusions of Professor Rajak are somewhat tentative. He says that the purpose of the research is to provide some evidence as to the functioning of the administration procedure and his hope is that it will assist in informing the debate as to the shape this regime should take in the future.

The procedure governing administrations is, of course, under review by the Department of Trade and Industry, which has issued a consultation paper on the subject (Insolvency Service, October 1993). The consensus seems to be that, while the procedure has worked reasonably well for large companies and in that sense can be judged a success, it has proved too costly to be of any great assistance in achieving the rehabilitation of small and medium sized enterprises that are in financial difficulties. Among the options for change being considered is one for the introduction of a debtor-in-possession moratorium on the enforcement of claims against an ailing business. One might proffer the opinion that this proposal is unlikely to obtain legislative acceptance. An even more radical proposal is that canvassed by the economists Hart, Moore and Aghion. They suggest that administration may fail to generate the decision that would maximize a company’s value, because those voting on it may prefer other outcomes. For example, if there is a choice between continuation as a going concern and an immediate liquidation that would pay off the senior creditors alone: senior creditors might vote for liquidation even if there is a good chance of the firm flourishing, for they may stand to gain little from this state of affairs. Junior creditors, on the other hand, might vote for continuation even if there is a high chance of the remaining assets being squandered, for they stand to gain nothing from liquidation. Hart, Moore and Aghion argue for a somewhat complicated automatic debt/equity swap which sets out to align people’s interests, while preserving the priority of claims. While their proposals are likely to be consigned to the metaphorical dustbin designed for the receipt of unwelcome ideas, the fact that the DTI has gone so far as to consult on their ideas shows the potential power of theoretical analysis in serving as a stimulus for insolvency law reform.

There is a valuable theoretical contribution by Professor Axel Flessner of Humboldt University, Berlin. He talks about the role of bankruptcy theory in advocating legislative or judicial solutions to serious and difficult policy problems. He distinguishes between asset and market philosophies on the one hand and forum and enterprise philosophies on the other. The protection of security interests against curtailment and erosion in bankruptcy seems to be the principal objective of asset and market philosophies. Forum and enterprise philosophy is used to prove the opposite by asserting that secured creditors basically belong to the same universe as unsecured creditors and should not therefore be immune from the peculiar demands of a bankruptcy proceeding.

Pro-creditor bias in Insolvency law is addressed by the editor of the volume, Professor Jacob Ziegel, in a paper that concentrates upon the status of the privately appointed receiver. Professor