Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE “CLAUSE PARAMOUNT” AND THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR
The Marinor
The “clause paramount” poses linguistic problems by transplanting the provisions of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules into the wider contractual terrain of charterparties. The courts’ response has been to give the Rules a liberal and purposive interpretation in their charterparty context. Phrases such as “loss and damage” in Art. IV have been construed so as to cover matters which have no connection at all with the carriage of cargo.1 Article III, r. 6, however, provides, “ … the carrier and the ship … shall in any event be discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought within one year of their delivery or of the date when they should have been delivered”. The different wording of this Article, in particular the highlighted words, demands that such claims have at least some connection with the carriage of cargo. The recent decision of Colman, J., in The Marinor
2 is particularly useful in providing guidance as to the degree of connection that is required to trigger the application of the time bar.
The facts
The Marinor was time chartered for 10 years, primarily for the carriage of sulphuric acid from the charterers’ plant in Quebec to its customers in U.S. East Coast ports, with the carriage of clay slurry on the reverse voyage. The vessel was delivered in November 1992 and initially performed her voyages without incident. However, after August 1993 problems occurred on four consecutive voyages, after which the cargo was out-turned in a contaminated condition which is said to have been unacceptable to the charterers’ U.S. customers. The charterers’ response was to charter in another vessel for the next carriage of sulphuric acid to their customers in Savannah.
They also decided to give the Marinor a final chance by arranging a consignment of acid—voyage 32—to Tampa, where it could be used in the fertilizer industry, even if discharged in a contaminated condition. The Marinor once more discharged the acid in a contaminated condition and on 14 November 1993 the charterers told the shipowners that they would use substitute vessels for future acid consignments and would use the Marinor solely for the carriage of clay slurry. Following remedial action, the Marinor resumed acid shipments in April 1994.
The charterers commenced arbitration on 6 February 1995 in respect of the above matters. They made two claims against the shipowners, alleging breaches of express terms
1. Such as Adamastos v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum [1959] A.C. 133 where the House of Lords held that the equivalent provision in the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 could provide a defence to delays in prosecuting a ballast voyage under the charter.
2. Noranda Inc. v. Barton (Time Charter) Ltd (The Marinor)
[1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 301.
173