Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE NORDIC MARITIME CODE ONCE AGAIN
Hugo Tiberg*
It was not unexpected that, for voyage chartering, the gauntlet of my criticism should have been picked up by a Norwegian, since the rules are said to be inspired from Norway. As Mr Trond Solvang’s observations have, however, mostly been disposed of in a series of articles in the Swedish Law Journal, I shall limit myself to a short rejoinder.
One general point is that Solvang, like the criticized legislator, seems to think that factual prevalence of a contractual regulation manifests the suitability of that regulation as a declaratory rule of law. To me the test of a good declaratory rule is its function for parties who have not made their own provisions, and emulation of contractual solutions is vain.
Now to Solvang’s observations.
Port/berth charters
The one point about port and berth charters on which all legal systems were agreed was that, where a ship’s destination is a berth, the ship must reach it before time can count. From this, a berth charter could be built up with exactly the kind of exceptions that the parties wanted. The new Nordic law has preferred, abolishing the customary distinction, to place the berthing risk upon the charterer irrespective of the basic clause used, according to assumed common practice. Whether the assumption is correct or not, the method violates parties’ intentions and invalidates compromises varying a berth charter. This illustrates the vanity of mimicking business practice and adopting a statistical mean as the legal rule.
It does not help if “many standard charters issued by charterers” put the berthing risk on the charterer. Good for him, but not for those who want another risk division based on the berth charter. One does not “strike a balance between the partes’ interests” in this manner but rather by allowing parties using internationally recognized formulæ to know where they stand! To recognize this is not “unwillingness to evaluate the amendment from a practical viewpoint”.
The anomaly of relieving the carrier from reaching the berth he undertook to reach while obliging him to find another if none was undertaken is hardly mitigated by order clauses modifying the berth-finding duty.1 Solvang’s observation that berth-finding is often illusory for the carrier rather enhances the anomaly.
* Professor of Law, University of Stockholm.
1. Solvang is not correct in implying that case law had always let the order clause relieve the carrier of berth-finding. That happened only where timely directions were lacking or a directed berth was unavailable: see H. Tiberg, The Law of Demurrage, 4th edn (1995), 254f. Two Norwegian decisions under the original 1893 Code held the same of general congestion, but their applicability to the later amended Code is doubtful.
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