The Society of Public Teachers of Law has become well known to academics in the United Kingdom. But to most practitioners and those outside the U.K. the Society remains relatively unknown. One of the features of the Society is the seminars that it organizes at All Souls College on various Saturdays throughout the year. The importance of these seminars is now evident in these two volumes of essays.

The editor, Professor Peter Birks, describes the seminars from which the essays arose as being “intended to make progress in areas in which the law has become confused” (Vol. II, iii). Four problematic areas of law are discussed in each volume. Volume I analyses: (i) knowing assistance and knowing receipt; (ii) bribes and secret commissions; (iii) the limits of judicial review; and (iv) the respective rights of parents and children. Volume II considers: (i) the Vienna Convention on the Sale of Goods; (ii) the condition of the law of tort; (iii) innovations in contract; and (iv) the remedial constructive trust. In choosing the authors of the papers Professor Birks has created a very impressive list of judges, academics, and practising lawyers. The scholarship displayed by all the authors is of the highest calibre and those who have an interest in any of the topics discussed should regard the relevant papers as being essential reading.

In discussing the problems which occur at the frontiers of liability the authors have often been forced to reconsider the basic categorization of the law of obligations. Where, for instance, do constructive trusts fall? Where should the prevention of unconscionable conduct be placed? How can one draw the distinction between contract, tort, and restitution? It would be naïve to expect easy answers to such questions. The nature and importance of the issues requires reasoned and considered debate—and the papers contained in these two volumes fulfil this criteria. The authors certainly do not all speak with one voice and there are many instances of conflicting arguments being presented in separate papers. But this healthy debate cannot be other than good for the development of the law. And in a manner befitting the intractable nature of the issues under consideration, the authors have generally chosen to eschew a didactic approach in favour of a discursive one. A good example of this is Sir Robin Cooke’s critique of the decisions in Murphy v. Brentwood D.C. [1991] 1 A.C. 398 and Kuwait Asia Bank Ltd. v. National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd. [1991] 1 A.C. 187. A reasoned and restrained evaluation of the decisions is given and arguments are advanced that the House of Lords and the Privy Council respectively may wish to reconsider the approach taken in each case.

Notwithstanding the wide range of topics under scrutiny, certain themes are evident throughout the papers. One is the need for a rational and general approach to the division (or unification) of law and equity. This issue underlies, for example, much of the uncertainty surrounding the role of unconscionability in the law of obligations. Another theme is the need to challenge the myopic view taken of the supremacy of English judge-made law. Suggestions were made in the latter regard to incorporate developments in other countries and for Parliamentary intervention where there has been judicial failure to develop the law in an adequate manner. The discussions of the Vienna Convention demonstrate that, in appropriate circumstances, it is necessary to overcome our fervent belief in the common law and accept that foreign legal concepts may provide a preferable means of regulating transactions. Nevertheless, Professor Francis Reynolds rightly points out that we must always question the value of piecemeal incorporation of foreign concepts: the Vienna Convention provides a rational basis for facilitating the negotiation and performance of some international sales of goods; but it does not appear to regulate either standard c.i.f. contracts or ancillary issues such as capacity and the passing of property.

The papers start from the assumption that progress cannot be made until the fundamental,