Giving evidence before me in the course of civil proceedings last year, a Swiss fiduciary agent who had actively assisted his clients to launder their funds was indignant at the suggestion that he had done anything wrong. “I never suspected for a moment”, he told me, “that the money represented the profits of drug-trafficking” (which it did not) “or the proceeds of fraud” (which it did). When asked what he thought the money was, he told me that he assumed that it was “merely” the proceeds of tax evasion or breaches of exchange control, or a bribe. “It usually is a bribe”, he explained, in tones which suggested that that made everything above board. When asked what steps he had taken to satisfy himself that the money did not represent the proceeds of criminal activities, whether drug-trafficking or fraud, he admitted that he had taken none; it was simply not practicable to do so.

International fraud is a huge and growing business. Electronic transfer of funds, the widespread use of nominee companies and offshore funds and the existence of havens like Panama and D’jibouti, where investigation is impossible, all contribute to the ease with which fraudsters can transfer substantial sums instantaneously from one country to another and conceal their source and ownership. They are significantly assisted by the reluctance of banks and professional men to enquire into their clients’ affairs, and by the attitude of mind displayed by the Swiss fiduciary agent. In his case, wilful blindness was a positive virtue; it was part of his job description.

In England and elsewhere the civil courts are increasingly concerned with attempts by the victims of fraud to trace their money and recover it from the persons who received it or assisted in its misdirection. This kind of litigation has become the staple diet of the Chancery Division, whose judges claim with some justification that they handle more fraud cases in a year than the Old Bailey.

There are immense practical difficulties in finding out what has happened to the money. It has usually been transmitted through an intricate network of companies and bank accounts in many different jurisdictions. The techniques of money laundering—by which is meant the dishonest concealment of the true ownership and source of funds—are numerous, diverse, complex, subtle, ever-changing, and secret. In many countries money laundering is not an offence. It is often facilitated by stringent bank secrecy laws. But there are hopeful signs that happy times for international criminals may be coming to an end. This useful publication assembles in a single and convenient place the texts of the various initiatives which mark recent international efforts to combat money laundering.

The initial breakthrough came with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, concluded in Vienna in December 1988. This has been ratified by more than 90 countries and has been in force since the end of 1990. The Convention is specifically limited to drug-related activities. It requires each signatory to establish as criminal offences under its domestic laws a wide range of drug-related acts when committed internationally. But it goes far beyond that. It contains a useful definition of money laundering and requires each signatory to take measures to render drug-related money laundering a criminal offence under its domestic law; and it requires the similar criminalization of the acquisition, possession or use of property with knowledge that it is derived from a drug-related offence. It requires each signatory to enact domestic legislation enabling