Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
EVOLUTION OF REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS
Bank of America v. Taylor
Ever since the Court of Appeal’s decision in Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd.,1 the courts of most common law jurisdictions have been struggling to determine principles to guide the proper application of representative actions in cases involving separate contracts either between numerous claimants and the one defendant or between a single plaintiff and numerous potential defendants. Markt represented the nadir of jurisprudence governing use of the representative action, an important procedural mechanism permitting the avoidance of litigation of numerous actions involving common issues and a common party. According to the approach adopted in Markt, a representative action would not usually be permitted in cases dealing with separate and individual contracts (apart from the traditionally recognized derivative actions by shareholders, or actions by creditors in disputes involving common funds, or common property), largely because of the court’s willingness to assume, without evidence, the likelihood of separate defences being raised were each claim to be prosecuted individually.2
The 80 years since Markt has witnessed a gradual, but determined, undermining of this restriction on the availability of the representative action. In Commonwealth jurisdictions, courts emphasizing the principle of convenience underpinning the procedural device have allowed representative actions to proceed despite the existence of separate and individual contracts.3 Substantial similarity of the contracts in issue will assist the court in concluding that a representative action would not lead to injustice; but perhaps more important is an increased awareness of the court’s ability to manage and reshape proceedings if new defences later become apparent, for example by adding new representatives to ensure that all defences are fully assessed.4
1. [1910] 2 K.B. 1021.
2. Ibid., 1030, per Vaughan Williams, L.J., 1040, per Fletcher Moulton, L.J.
3. Gaetjens v. Arndale (Kilkenny) Ply. Ltd. [1969] S.A.S.R. 470 (South Aust. S.C.); Cobbold v. TIME Canada Ltd. (1976) 71 D.L.R. (3d) 629; 13 O.R. (2d) 567 (Ont. H.C.); and R. J. Flowers Ltd. v. Burns [1987] 1 N.Z.L.R. 260 (N.Z.H.C.). All three cases interpreted rules of court substantially identical in wording to R.S.C. Ord. 15, r. 12(1). However, for evidence of a more restrictive approach, and a retreat to Markt in New South Wales, see Esanda Finance Corp. Ltd. v. Carnie (1992) A.S.C. 56–191 (N.S.W.C.A.).
4. Flowers v. Burns, supra fn. 3, at p. 273.
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