This volume is the first in a new series—the Cambridge International Documents Series—produced by the Research Centre for International Law at Cambridge University. It provides a wealth of documentation concerning the historical background to the dispute between Iraq and Kuwait and the response of the international community to the Iraqi invasion of August 1990. This is presented in a series of chapters relating to the United Nations (including the texts of the relevant resolutions and extracts from Security Council debates), the imposition of sanctions, the naval and air interdiction, and allegations concerning the practice of Iraq concerning the protection of individuals and property both in Iraq and Kuwait. Materials relating to a number of peace initiatives are included and a final chapter deals with the response of a number of other international and regional organizations to the crisis, including the Arab League, the European Community, NATO and OPEC.

The cut-off date for inclusion of material is 10 December 1990. In a sense, this is not a bad moment. Security Council Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force after 15 January 1991, had been adopted and the world was in a state of limbo, waiting to see what would come of this. On the other hand, it can now be seen that the approach and emphasis adopted in this volume has, to an extent, been overtaken by events. Indeed, one wonders whether it will, ultimately, be accurate to perceive these events as being the “Kuwait” crisis at all.

The opening chapter, dealing with the historical background, though excellent in itself, tends to give the impression that it is in the diplomatic history that the reason for the crisis can be found and, by implication, that it is from within this body of material that a solution might be sought. While the historical factors are certainly relevant and inform our understanding of the current political factors, the historic context is not necessarily the most appropriate for understanding the current situation. Political and economic factors are at least as relevant as the line drawn on a map by Sir Percy Cox in 1922. As the extracts included make clear, that line was itself determined by political expediency. Perhaps such factors deserve more coverage than they receive. The editors have also removed statements unrelated to the legal issues from the extracts of the Security Council debates. Perhaps the true difficulty is that not all disputes can be realistically reduced to their legal components. This is made evident in Chapter 2, which contains statements made by both Iraq and Kuwait outlining their cases as at the end of November 1990. (One cannot help but observe that Kuwait seemed to understand its audience better than Iraq.)

Further volumes in this series would undoubtedly seek to remedy some of these problems. But others would merely be highlighted. For example, should future volumes look at the emergent difficulties in northern Iraq, the omission of the relevant historical background to that problem would become glaring. True, this could receive its own coverage but an opportunity to place the award of the Mosul Vilayet to Iraq in the context of the overall settlement of Mesopotamia would have been lost. The region has suffered from being treated in a disjointed and piecemeal fashion throughout this century. Perhaps it is time to adopt a more unified approach. Although this book is not designed to provide a comprehensive history of