For those who thought Belgium had become a no-man’s land for international commercial arbitration, here is refutation. It is all the more telling since one of its co-authors, Professor Marcel Storme, is described (p. 3, fn. 3) as “the main promoter” of the 1985 Act, which—according to its critics—had the effect of turning Belgium into that no-man’s land. The 1985 Act, of course, divested the Belgian courts of any jurisdiction to hear applications to set awards aside if neither party to the dispute is a Belgian national or resident, or incorporated or having an establishment there. (It was a minuscule bit of legislation—the insertion of Art. 1717(4) in the Code judiciaire—with a big effect.) The result is that for such “pure” international arbitrations an award rendered in Belgium cannot be cut off at the root (i.e., at the seat of arbitration) no matter how serious the misconduct of the arbitrators. Rather, the victim of such an evil award, unable to seise a Belgian court as plaintiff, would have to wait and raise his complaints as a defendant in an enforcement action. To some, this has turned Belgium into the promised land; to others, the Belgian legal system has abdicated its responsibility and become a haven for outlaws. Much has already been written on this reform (In English, see E. Gaillard, “Belgium: Statute on the Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards” (1986) Int. Leg. Mat. 725; M. Storme, “Belgium: A Paradise for International Commercial Arbitration” 14 Int. Bus. Lawyer 294; J. Paulsson, “Arbitration Unbound in Belgium (1986) 2 Arb. Int. 68; A. Vanderelst, “Increasing the Appeal of Belgium as an International Arbitration Forum?” 1986 J. Int. Arb. 77). It hardly comes as a surprise that the authors staunchly defend the new hands-off regime. But in this book they also show that the 1985 Act does not turn Belgian law into an irrelevancy for international arbitrations conducted in the country.

Most obviously, the ambit and effect of the 1985 Act itself must be examined. The authors acquit themselves of this task quite briefly (pp. 88–94). They take the view that, for a corporate entity to be characterized as sufficiently established in Belgium to give the Belgian courts jurisdiction to hear challenges, it is not sufficient to set up a mail-lot operation there; “there must be an office on Belgian territory in which someone is based who has the power to enter into binding obligations in Belgium on behalf of the company” (p. 90). As the law does not specify the time at which the Belgian connection must be fulfilled, the question also arises whether the relevant point in the time is that of signature of the contract, commencement of