THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME edited by Christopher C. Joyner, Associate Professor of Political Science, School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington D.C. and Sudhir K. Chopra, Chairman of the Antarctica Interest Group of the American Society of International Law. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht and London (1988, xi and 281 pp., plus 6 pp. Index). Hardback £49.95.

This study is the outcome of papers completed early in 1987 under the auspices of the Antarctica Interest Group of the American Society of International Law and, although the Preface claims that it is important to analyse “national views” on Antarctic matters, the list of the 10 contributors indicates that most of them have strong American connections. The book’s disclaimer as to being comprehensive in its coverage is perhaps somewhat modest in the light of the large number of issues surveyed.

The essays fall into two parts: Part 1 (“Law and Politics”) and Part 2 (“Resource Regimes and Environmental Protection”). They include: discussion of the politics of the consultative parties (Rowland); the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOS) in Antarctica (Kimball); the need for a private international law regime (Carl); law of the sea issues (Vicuna); the evolving minerals regime (Joyner); a possible “commons” regime (Chopra); a regime for ice-covered areas (Kindt); management of living resources (Gulland); legal aspects of environmental protection (Barnes); and analogies with the regime in outer space (Taubenfeld).

Common themes run through most of these contributions, including most obviously discussion of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, especially the “title freezing” Art. IV, which allegedly has put the political debate on Antarctica “in hibernation” for 20 years (Rowland, p. 11). (It does, however, seem misleading to allege, as does Chopra (p. 175) that under this treaty “Antarctica is not owned by anyone”.) Apart from the treaty, the Antarctic regime is interpreted also to include the recommendations of consultative meetings, the Agreed Measures on Flora and Fauna (1965), the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972) and the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (“CCAMLR”) (1980), as well as the developing rules on a mineral regime (p. 11). It is noteworthy that the “sovereignty” issue also runs through the two latter “resources” issues and has been dealt with in a similar way (dubbed “bifocalism”: p. 26): see Art. IV of CCAMLR, which effectively preserves the status quo for coastal claimants’ rights in maritime areas (Vicũna, p. 110) and allows claimants and non-claimants to interpret the same language differently—possibly even leading to a “gradual liquidation” of sovereignty claims (Chopra, p. 170).

The “delicate handling of the claims issue” (Joyner, p. 137) is also to be seen in the negotiations for an Antarctic minerals regime (analogous to that leading to Art. IV of CCAMLR above), as here it was envisaged that claimant states should effectively have a “veto” and a balance struck between claimant and non-claimant states on the regulatory committees (p. 140). In this respect, events have overtaken the book (as is predicted, e.g., at p. 133), for it was agreed on 2 June 1988 to establish a treaty regime on minerals containing what were