A number of difficulties arise when considering Japanese law as a distinct area of study. First, there is the well-publicized Japanese dislike of entanglement in the legal process and desire to avoid litigation. Professor Noda in his Introduction to Japanese Law wrote that never to use the law or be involved with it “is the normal hope of honourable [Japanese] people”. Another commentator has stated “Japan was able to adopt a formal system of positive law as easily as it did precisely because there was no positive commitment to it. The evidence as to the contemporary scene suggests that positive law is relatively little used within Japanese society” (Richard W. Rabinowitz in a series of lectures delivered in 1963–1964). He concludes: “Law exists in the society but is not very important.” Little has changed since then, and other cultural factors remain more important within Japanese society. This means, for example, that the anti-monopoly law exists alongside a number of flourishing cartels, and sex equality and environmental legislation are frequently ignored. A guarantee may be taken as part of a business transaction but its enforcement between Japanese is unthinkable because the moral obloquy of being associated with a failed transaction is greater than the fear of an adverse judgment in the courts. Legislation is sometimes over-ridden by the policy of “administration guidance” issued by civil servants (in other words, the executive trumps the legislature).

Secondly, there is not a great wealth of jurisprudential tradition in Japan. Although legal codes were promulgated at various times in Japanese history, the main sources of modern law are the legislation enacted in the years after the Meiji restoration in 1868, which was derived mostly from French and German sources, and the legislation of American origins, much of it inspired by New Deal concepts, which was enacted during the Allied Powers’ occupation (1945–1951). Although the concept of law is widely respected, a lack of precedent leads to considerable doubt as to what that law is in certain circumstances. Furthermore, although the Japanese lawyer is highly regarded today in the role of sensei (teacher) and social guardian rather than as a purveyor of legal services, the legal profession and the means of enforcement of legal rights both barely existed 125 years ago. A form of ADR frequently employed in those days was the submission of disagreements to resolution by a nearby innkeeper. Thirdly, the corpus of Japanese law which has been established has not proved influential in the development of other legal systems. Japanese attitudes towards the law and the resolution of disputes have not proved as exportable as, say, Japanese attitudes towards industrial relations or Japanese technology and finance.

Most people who do embark on a study of Japanese law will do so for business reasons: most usually because they contemplate entering into an agreement with a Japanese company. However their interest arises, they will now have Professor Oda’s well-researched and readable introduction to guide them. When some parts of the West seem to be plunged into a cauldron of endless litigation, it may be that the Japanese attitude of reluctance towards involvement in lawsuits has something to teach us. However, those who believe that a Japanese company, when faced with the possibility of litigation against a Western party after a contract has gone sour, will simply submit to almost any terms in order to avoid having its name dragged through the courts, could, as Professor Oda observes, be in for a nasty shock.