Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
ACCOUNT OF PROFITS AND MIXED FUNDS
Rohan Havelock*
Tang v Tang
An account of profits is one of Equity’s most powerful remedies, dating from at least the thirteenth century1 and established in its modern form by Keech v Sandford.2 A fiduciary who makes an unauthorised profit must disgorge it, irrespective of whether or not he acted in good faith, and irrespective of whether or not the principal has suffered any loss as a result of the fiduciary’s actions.3 The profit will sometimes represent a windfall to the principal;4 but Equity tolerates this as the price of enforcing its stringent standards.
The availability of account of profits reflects the strict and unrelenting approach with which Equity polices those in fiduciary positions. It is commonly accepted that this approach is prophylactic:5 to prevent the risk of any harm to the principal as a result of abuse or exploitation by the fiduciary of his or her position. In order to achieve this, Equity imposes the no-conflict and no-profit rules on fiduciaries, and supplements these with a suite of remedies, both personal and proprietary. It has been said that these rules and remedies ensure that the fiduciary remains disinterested in carrying out his duties,6 or is deterred from the temptation of abuse.7 From another perspective, they may be seen as exacting the single-minded loyalty of the fiduciary to the principal.8
The particular remedy of account of profits generates difficulty and uncertainty, including as to the underlying reason(s) for its award (for example, does it serve a punitive function?) and the circumstances in which it will be awarded (for example, should it be available for breach of contract?). A more specific issue is the degree of causation required (if any) between the breach by the fiduciary and the making of the profit, and, in particular, whether a “but-for” test applies, as in the case of equitable compensation.9 This was recently considered by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Tang Ying Loi v Tang Ying Ip,10 to which we can now turn. The judgment is also noteworthy for discussion of liability in a case of mixing of trust funds and the personal funds of the fiduciary, which will also be examined briefly.
1. W Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd edn (Little Brown, Boston, 1923), vol.2, 367.
2. (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; 25 ER 223.
3. Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL).
4. As in Reading v Attorney-General [1951] AC 507 and Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 (HL).
5. Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 (HL), 51. See also M Conaglen, “The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty” (2005) 121 LQR 452, arguing that prophylaxis is directed to the protection of non-fiduciary duties.
6. Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL), 280 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).
7. Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959, [77] (Arden LJ) and [107] (Jonathan Parker LJ).
8. See S Worthington, Equity, 2nd edn (OUP, Oxford, 2006), 131–134.
9. Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] 1 AC 421 (HL), 434 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). In New Zealand at least, this test has been alleviated by the provision of a narrow “escape route” to the fiduciary if he can show that the loss would have occurred regardless of breach: see Bank of New Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd [1999] 1 NZLR 664 (CA), 687. For further discussion, see P Devonshire, Account of Profits (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2013), [3.3.5] and G Virgo, “Restitutionary Remedies for Wrongs: Causation and Remoteness”, in C Rickett and R Grantham (eds), Justifying Private Law Remedies (Hart, Oxford, 2008), 333.
10. [2015] HKCA 523.
Case and comment
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