This volume is a fitting tribute to a man who shook off the shackles of a Chancery training to become, as a judge, a leading exponent of English commercial law and, as Executive Chairman of the International Law Association for 23 years, a proponent of the role of law in international society. To provide an appreciation of Lord Wilberforce’s contributions in both spheres, the two main sections of the book are devoted to those aspects of his work. However, there are two later sections, one dealing with European Community Law (a paper on “The Impact of Community Law on Indirect Taxation” by N. P. M. Elles) and the other with Public Law (“Lord Wilberforce and Administrative Law” by Professor D. G. T. Williams).

An Introduction is provided by Lord Hailsham, who refers to his fellow peer as “one of the most distinguished and versatile lawyers of our day”. It is a reflection on the breadth of Lord Wilberforce’s contributions to the development of English law that Lord Hailsham felt unable to do justice to an invitation to provide a survey of them. This is a pity because, as a consequence, the book does not convey adequately the great sense and thoughtfulness of so many of his judgments. Somewhat curiously, Lord Hailsham refers to the concidence between the careers of Lord Wilberforce and Lord Diplock. If anything, the striking aspect of this parallel is that, unlike Lord Wilberforce, Lord Diplock produced a number of leading pronouncements that would have greatly benefited from Lord Wilberforce’s innate common sense. One could not imagine Lord Wilberforce bestowing upon the legal profession an unnecessary lecture on the nature of ostensible authority (as in Freeman & Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd. [1964] 2 Q.B. 480, at 505) with its insidious trap for the unwary (see Crabtree-Vickers Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Direct Mail Advertising & Addressing Co. Pty. Ltd. (1975) 133 C.L.R. 72); or on the nature of contractual terms (Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 26, at 69–70), in words that needed subsequent clarification (see Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export S.A. [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 294, at 305, per Megaw, L.J.; [1981] 1 W.L.R. 711, at 715, per Lord Wilberforce), though unfortunately perhaps the courts seem to have taken up with some enthusiasm the notion that there are three categories of contractual terms (can it really be supposed, as a matter of common sense, that there is a class of “contractual undertakings of which it can be predicated that no breach can give rise to an event which will deprive the party not in default of substantially the whole benefit which it was intended that he should obtain from the contract”: Hong Kong Fir, supra, at 70, per Diplock, L.J.? cf. Applewood Lane West Ltd. v. Scott (1987) 35 D.L.R. (4th) 287); or a contorted interpretation of the Arbitration Act 1979 in Pioneer Shipping Ltd. v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd. (The Nema) [1982] A.C. 724, at 742–743, and its follow up Antaios Compania Naviera S.A. v. Salen Rederierna A.B. (The Antaios) [1985] A.C. 191, at 205–7 (see the comments of Kerr, L.J., in discussing “Commercial Dispute Resolution”, pp. 125–126). The contrast with Lord Wilberforce could not be greater: see, for example, the latter’s judgments in New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. v. A. M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. (The Eurymedon) [1975] A.C. 154 at 167; Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export S.A., supra; Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd. [1976] A.C. 443, at 460 et seq. (quoted in part by Lord Hailsham, p. 6), though it is a pity that Lord Wilberforce did not take the opportunity of asserting, in Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl G.m.b.H. [1983] 2 A.C. 34, at 42, the principle that acceptance of an offer had to be communicated to the offeror, whether or not the “principle of simultaneity” is satisfied, and whether the expected means of communi-