Rebecca Wallace begins her preface: “The aim of this students’ introductory text is modest”. The intention is to provide a basic text to be read as an accompaniment to existing United Kingdom and United States casebooks; this is not to be a full-blown textbook. The aim may be limited but it is not one that is easy to achieve. Any attempt to “present the basic principles of the international legal system succinctly with (i) a lucid and comprehensive exposition of the basic concepts necessary for the understanding of the international legal process; and (ii) a general and integrated overview of contemporary international law” in 258 pages of text inevitably runs the risk that brevity will produce obscurity and distortion. There are instances of both in this book. The distinction between void and voidable treaties and the progress from the regulation of “war” to the United Nations Charter provisions on the threat or use of force are left unclear. The U.S. was not the first country to adopt a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. The U.K. change of practice in the recognition of governments has not been fully assimilated; too much space is given to the discussion of prior cases and too little to the consideration of the impact of this change. But on the whole Wallace provides a serviceable introduction to international law from an Anglo-American point of view. She gives an impression of the scope and diversity of modern international law. The book would have been improved by more careful editing; for example, “infer” and “refute” are constantly misused.

Finally, some of Wallace’s conclusions are controversial and, as they are presented without qualification (again this may be attributable to restrictions on space), could mislead students just beginning their study of international law. Thus, many would challenge the statements that Art. 38 of the Statute of the I.C.J. “is establishing a hierarchy of procedure for the application of international law in the settlement of international disputes”, that treaties are a formal source of law, and that self-determination is not a principle of customary international law.