Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OVER AGENCY CONTRACTS
Peralta Shipping Corp. v. Smith & Johnson Corp.
The concern over expanding admiralty and maritime jurisdiction into “uncharted waters” by retreating from a traditional, mechanically applied jurisdictional rule has led many courts to conclude that general agency agreements are not maritime contracts. By characterizing such agreements as providing for shore services which are preliminary to voyages rather than for services that relate to the management and navigation of vessels, courts have treated agency agreements as they would any other contract whose non-maritime nature is well accepted1. Courts adhering to this distinction believe that it is a mechanism to restrain Federal law from inappropriately and unnecessarily making inroads where local law is competent to govern transactions which may only be remotely related to the shipping industry2.
Peralta v. Smith & Johnson
3 falls in line with the established rule in its holding, but calls upon the Supreme Court to accept general agency agreements as cognizable in admiralty at its next opportunity. In Peralta a general agent for the Bangladesh Shipping Corp. (Bangladesh) entered an agreement with Smith & Johnson (S & J) whereby S & J was appointed as “Gulf agent” responsible for arranging services for all Bangladesh vessels calling at ports between Brownsville, Texas and Tampa, Florida. S & J’s President summarized his company’s obligations under the agreement as being “to handle [Bangladesh’s] vessels at [the Gulf] ports, to shift cargo, enter and clear vessels, supervise the loading of vessels and account for the disbursements and expenditures and to collect freights”4. A suit seeking an accounting was filed by Peralta in the District Court for the Southern District of New York claiming that S & J breached the agency agreement when it wrongfully retained freight money from Bangladesh’s vessels and money that had been advanced by Peralta to pay Bangladesh’s vessels’ suppliers and vendors. The District Court rejected S & J’s contention that it had been relieved of its contractual obligations5 and initially granted
1 People’s Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 673 (U.S. 1857): contract to build ship is not a maritime contract; Armour & Co. v. Ft. Morgan S.S. Co., 270 U.S. 253 (1926): broker agreement to procure a charter is not a maritime contract; Marquardt v. French, 53 Fed. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1893): contract to procure maritime insurance is not cognizable in admiralty.
2 The Thames, 10 Fed. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1881).
3 739 F.2d 798 (1984); cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 1405.
4 Peralta’s agency agreement with S & J read “S & J shall act as ship’s husbanding agents for [Bangladesh’s] vessels at the [GULF] ports and shall perform the services normally incident thereto, including arranging for entrance and clearance of vessels at the Custom House, execution of all Custom House documents incidental thereto, arranging for fuel, water, provisions, emergency repairs, port charges and other similar matter, and for stevedoring, storage and other cargo handling; arranging for tugs …; assisting in the procuring/repatriating necessary ship’s personnel as requested by the Master, hospitalization of officers and other crew members; and shall issue bills of lading to shippers and passenger tickets to passengers as Agents as required; and shall use its best efforts in soliciting and securing cargoes in developing traffic and passengers for [Bangladesh] vessels. [S & J] shall appoint sub-agents in all ports where S & J does not have its own offices …
“S & J will arrange for all services necessary for the prompt turnaround of vessels, including all matters of ship husbanding nature, and will have qualified superintendents in attendance as necessary so as to at all times insure adequate supervision and the efficient working of the vessel, the cost of which is to be borne by S & J”.
5 S & J unsuccessfully contended that its sister corporation, a bankrupt Louisiana corporation, had assumed, with Peralta’s consent, sole responsibility for S & J’s obligations.
12