Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE DISCLOSURE OF CRIMINAL INFORMATION TO INSURERS
Philip H. Clarke.*
As an applicant for insurance is under a duty1 to disclose all material information to the insurer when seeking to obtain,2 renew3 or vary4 an insurance policy, he may be obliged to disclose information known5 to him concerning any offences of which he, or someone associated with him, has been convicted or suspected of committing. Should such an obligation arise, failure to disclose this information will render the policy issued to the applicant voidable at the insurer’s option. The purpose of this article is to examine the kinds of information relating to criminal and traffic offences, generically referred to herein as “criminal information”, that an applicant must disclose in order to fulfil the duty of disclosure. This application of the duty has been the subject of a number of recent decisions in England and Australia. These indicate that, although there may have been some change in public attitudes to the significance of certain convictions, exemplified by the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, the relevance of criminal information to the formation of insurance contracts has not diminished.
1. What criminal information must be disclosed ?
The duty of disclosure requires an applicant to disclose “material” information. In Lambert v. Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.6 it was finally established that “material” in this context is to be defined by reference to the views of a prudent
* Faculty of Law, Monash University, Australia.
1 This duty is imposed by law because insurance contracts are contracts of the utmost good faith—uberrima fides: Claude R. Ogden & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Reliance Fire Sprinkler Co. [1973] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 7 and [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52; March Cabaret Club & Casino Ltd. v. The London Assurance
[1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 169. For a general discussion of the duty see Ivamy, General Principles of Insurance Law (4th edn., 1979), Chap. 13 and MacGillivray and Parkington on Insurance Law (7th edn., 1981), paras. 614–705.
2 The duty to disclose continues until the contract of insurance is concluded or, if this is postponed by the terms of the policy, until the insurer becomes bound: Canning v. Farquhar (1886) 16 Q.B.D. 727. The duty also operates when temporary cover is sought prior to completion of a formal contract: Mayne Nickless v. Pegler [1974] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 228.
3 The duty to disclose applies to a renewal when renewal involves the making of a new contract: Swinimer v. Corkum (1978) 89 D.L.R. (3d) 245; Lambert v. Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. [1975]
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 485.
4 Cornhill Insurance Co. Ltd. v. L. & B. Assenheim
(1937) 58 Ll.L.Rep. 27.
5 The duty of disclosure only requires the applicant to disclose what he knows or is deemed in law to know: Ivamy, op. cit., pp. 133–135 and MacGillivray and Parkington, op. cit., paras. 618–621. In the case of marine insurance, an applicant is deemed to know what in the ordinary course of business he ought to know: Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 18(1). Whether constructive knowledge applies in relation to non-marine insurances was left undecided in Australia and New Zealand Bank Ltd. v. Colonial & Eagle Wharves Ltd.; (Boag Third Party) [1960] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 241.
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