Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY UPON MORTGAGES OF FUTURE PROPERTY
Paul Matthews.
I. Introductory
A. borrows money from B., and the loan is secured by A.’s covenanting to assign by way of security to B. certain future property, say, all the property which A. shall thereafter acquire from C. on C.’s death. The moment C. dies, leaving Blackacre to
A., the property is (subject to due formality in the original contract) bound by the covenant, equity regarding as done that which ought to be done. Thus B. acquires the equitable interest in Blackacre eo instante, without B.’s having to do any further act.1 Suppose, however, that before C. dies, A. is adjudicated bankrupt. B. must prove in the bankruptcy for what A. owes, for all provable liabilities are released by the debtor’s discharge from bankruptcy.2 Clearly the loan by B. to A. will be so extinguished. What about the covenant to assign any future property from C.? Is that provable in and so released by the debtor’s discharge from the bankruptcy? More directly to the point, if, after A.’s bankruptcy, C. dies leaving Blackacre to A. has B. any rights in the property, e.g. against subsequent purported assignees? Re Lind
3 is an authority in the Court of Appeal for answering that question affirmatively. This article attempts to show that Re Lind appears to offend against fundamental equitable principles, is inconsistent with earlier decisions in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, and runs a coach and four through the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. It is submitted that, as a consequence, it should not be followed.
II. Equity and assignments of future property
At common law there is an enormous and vital difference between assignment or transfer and a contract to assign or transfer: the former shifts the property, the latter is a mere promise to do so, breach of which will ground liability in damages. However,
“[i]n equity it is not necessary for the alienation of property that there should be a formal deed of conveyance. A contract for valuable consideration, by which it is agreed to make a present transfer of property, passes at once the beneficial interest, providing the contract is one of which a Court of Equity will decree specific performance. In the language of Lord Hardwicke, the vendor becomes a trustee for the vendee …”.4
Here, of course, we are speaking simply of existing property and a contract for present transfer. What about future property and transfer?
1 Holroyd v. Marshall (1862) 10 H.L.C. 191; 11 E.R. 999.
2 Bankruptcy Act 1914, s. 28(2), replacing earlier Acts.
3 [1915] 2 Ch. 345.
4 Per Lord Westbury, L.C., in Holroyd v. Marshall (1862) 10 H.L.C. 191, at p. 209, 11 E.R. 999, at p. 1006, lines 24–9.
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