In June, 1967, the Law Reform Committee was invited to consider whether any changes were desirable in the law relating to conversion, detinue and the recaption of chattels, and at the Committee’s own request, trespass to goods. The Committee published its 18th Report in 1971 (Cmnd. 4774) but it took until 1977 to put into effect their recommendations.

The 50-page report has produced a short 17-section Act which, in the words of the Attorney-General, “makes some modest and useful changes in the law” which had hitherto been a “layman’s trap and a law student’s nightmare.” The Act seeks to simplify not merely the substantive law relating to the above mentioned torts, but also the complicated procedural rules that accompanied them.

The first major proposal is the abolition of detinue (s. 2(1)). Fact situations that were formerly covered by an action in detinue, for instance where goods bailed are lost or destroyed, will now be covered by the tort of conversion. While conversion and trespass to goods remain intact, s. 1 talks of “wrongful interference with goods” but no attempt is made to codify this branch of the law. The Committee felt that attempted codification would have necessitated a much more detailed Bill and consequently one more difficult to proceed with in terms of parliamentary time.

Complicated differences formerly existed as to the remedies available in detinue and conversion, for example as to the type of remedy or, where damages were sought, then as to the date of assessment of those damages. Section 3 seeks to simplify this problem. Where the goods are in the possession or control of the wrongdoer the remedy may take one of three forms. The court may order the delivery of the goods and a sum to represent any consequential damage; or there may be an order for delivery but giving the defendant the alternative of paying damages, calculated by reference to the value of the goods; whichever is chosen, consequential damages may also be awarded; or damages alone may be given. The first of the three remedies may only be granted at the court’s discretion. When damages for wrongful interference are granted and assessed on the basis that the plaintiff is being compensated for the whole of his interest in the goods then this extinguishes such person’s title to that interest. One complication that arises here is that s. 5(1) (b) makes the above assessment dependent on any defence of contributory negligence that might exist. However, s. 11(1) states that in proceedings founded on conversion or intentional trespass to goods contributory negligence shall be no defence. The Law Reform Committee explained the conflicting views that existed at the time of their deliberations in relation to this defence (paras. 79–82). They recommended, and this is what has been adopted in the Act, that in general contributory negligence should not be accepted as a defence. Unfortunately, that leaves one in the position of having to guess when it will be an acceptable defence. Specific mention was made of the problems relating to banking and the case of Lumsden & Co. v. London Trustee Savings Bank, [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 114, where it