In the February, 1977, issue of this publication ([1977] 1 LMCLQ 24) Mr. Manfred W. Arnold, Vice-President of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, gave his views as to whether the charterer is entitled to six hours’ notice in the case of the “Exxonvoy 1969” charter-party at the discharge port if the vessel is already “on demurrage” on its arrival there. Mr. Arnold stated that in his opinion the charterer in such circumstances was not entitled to any notice and cited, as authority, the judgment of Donaldson, J., in Pagnan and Fratelli v. Tradax Export S.A. [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 150, at p. 154, and also the “accepted maxim of ‘once on demurrage always on demurrage’.”

Over the last five years the writer has been involved in some 200 “spot” voyage charters, many of which involved, later, protracted “negotiations” for the settlement of demurrage claims and thus has a certain amount of first-hand knowledge of owners’ views on the interpretation of the “Exxonvoy 1969.”

However, before unfolding my arguments I would refer to Mr. Arnold’s statement at p. 26 that it is the charterer who proposes or rather imposes the form of charter-party. This may be true where the charterer is one of the large international oil companies who have the dual role of owners and also charterers and have their own printed form of charter-party. It is certainly not so in the case of the smaller charterer such as my company where invariably in making his offer the owner gives the form of charter-party to be used. In the past this was usually the London Form (which incidentally is still popular with the U.S.S.R. and their friends) but has now been generally replaced by the “Exxonvoy 1969” subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts and arbitration in London.

The writer’s experience suggests that there is no hard and fast rule in this matter. Moreover, the dicta of Donaldson, J., cited above, concerned the “Baltimore Form C Grain” charter-party and do not apply automatically to the “Exxonvoy 1969.”

A convenient point of departure for this review is Union of India v. Compania Naviera Aeolus S.A. [1960] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 112, where the “Centrocon” charter-party came under discussion. The “strike clause” in this charter-party referred to “time for loading or discharging” not counting in certain circumstances. McNair, J., held that “time for loading or discharging” meant “time allowed for loading or discharging” and not “time used for loading or discharging.”

When the “Exxonvoy 1969” was drafted it must be supposed that Exxon’s lawyers were aware of this decision and wished to avoid the trap it exposed, which could explain the somewhat different expressions used in this charter-party.

On p. 24 Mr. Arnold cites the four relevant clauses of the “Exxonvoy 1969,” namely Part I—cl. H (which usually is completed by “72 hours” and cll. 6, 7 and 8 of Part II. Now cl. H is headed “Total Laytime in Running Hours.”

It will be noted that in cl. 6 it is stated that “laytime, as hereinafter provided, commences either 6 hours after the receipt of the notice or when the vessel is moored in