Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IN THE U.S. SHIPPING ACT—SHOULD IT BE ELIMINATED OR MODIFIED?
John P. Meade
of Messrs. Graham & James, Washington, D.C.
Control over agreements and practices of ocean common carriers in United States foreign commerce is exercised out of Washington by the Federal Maritime Commission (“the FMC”) under the Shipping Act 1916, as amended (“the Act”)1. Pursuant to s. 15 of the Act2, concerted activities of ocean common carriers in the U.S. trades are exempt from the U.S. antitrust laws if they are authorised by agreements approved by the FMC3. Agreements on rates and practices between common carriers in the U.S. trades must be filed for approval, and if approved are subject to FMC supervision under the Act’s provisions and the FMC’s regulations elaborating on those provisions. The major approved agreements are the shipping conference agreements covering rates and practices in the various inbound and outbound U.S. foreign trades4.
In the 60 years since passage of the Act, the U.S. Department of Justice has sought to whittle down the control exercised by the FMC and its predecessors5 over competition in this industry. Other critics of the exemption also have argued that it should be modified or eliminated6. A pending development is the completion of a report on the subject by the Justice Department Antitrust Division’s recently-established “Regulatory Reform Unit7.” Previous positions and comments of the Justice Department and its officials make it likely this group’s report will espouse an anti-conference view and argue anew for a narrowing or repeal of the Act’s antitrust exemption. This article will discuss the advisability of such action.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE EXEMPTION
In the late 1800s, in response to a shipping industry crisis precipitated by excess capacity and resulting rate wars, ocean shipping conferences were created. The fundamental purpose of conferences was to preserve economic stability, as was recognised by both of the major investigations into their practices prior to passage of
1 46 U.S.C. s. 801, et seq. (1970).
2 46 U.S.C. s. 814 (1970).
3 It should be noted that the Shipping Act antitrust exemption is not unique. There are more than 30 clear antitrust exemptions whereby activities of such groups as labour unions, insurance companies, export trade associations and agricultural and fishermen’s co-operative associations are immunised.
4 For discussions of the conference system, see generally, D. Marx, “International Shipping Cartels” (1953); OECD, “Maritime Transport” (1976); UNCTAD, “The Liner Conference System” (1970).
5 In 1933, President Roosevelt abolished the Shipping Board as a separate entity and transferred its functions to a Shipping Board Bureau of the Department of Commerce (Executive Order No. 6166, s. 12, June 10, 1933). In 1937 Congress again created a separate regulatory agency for the shipping industry, the United States Maritime Commission. In 1950, that Commission’s responsibilities were transferred to the Federal Maritime Board by Reorganisation Plan No. 21 of 1950, ss. 101-104, May 24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3178, 64 Stat. 1273. The Federal Maritime Board was abolished by Reorganisation Plan No. 7 of 1961, effective Aug. 12, 1961, and its functions were transferred as provided in such plan to the Secretary of Commerce and the Federal Maritime Commission.
6 See, e.g., R. Larner, “Public Policy in the Ocean Freight Industry,” in A. Phillips, ed., “Promoting Competition in Regulated Industries” (1975).
7 The Regulatory Reform Unit was formed in September 1975 to study the justification for certain exemptions from the U.S. antitrust laws. It has participated in the drafting of various pieces of legislation designed to produce changes in the regulatory laws, including s. 2028 which is discussed infra. Currently, the Unit is focusing its attention on ocean shipping, among other industries.
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