Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly
THE LAST STAND: FOAKES V BEER
Josias Senu *
This article examines the unresolved issue in the doctrine of consideration within varied contracts following the UK Supreme Court’s cautious comments in MWB v Rock. The article provides a brief overview of how consideration in varied contracts has developed over time since Foakes v Beer. It then suggests why the practical benefit analysis in Williams v Roffey is not a fait accompli. The central argument is that Foakes v Beer should not be overruled for being a commercially irrational decision, and that there are still good reasons for favouring its orthodoxy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of consideration in varied contracts came under fresh scrutiny in the Supreme Court in Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd.1 However, the decision did nothing to resolve the critical issue faced in the English law of contract, namely the desired reconciliation between Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd
2 and Foakes v Beer.3 Instead, the Supreme Court deferred the matter. For a number of decades, the focus of the analysis has largely been on extending practical benefit to part-payment cases and curtailing the effect of Foakes v Beer. While some academics have criticised the reasoning in Williams v Roffey,4 the overwhelming majority has regarded Foakes v Beer to be commercially indefensible.5 For example, as early as 1937, the Law Revision Committee recommended departing from Foakes v Beer owing to the commercial benefits a creditor may receive by not insisting on the payment of a whole debt due.6 For many, departing from Foakes v Beer is a commercially sensible position. However, in this article a different view is taken. It will be contended that we should reject the idea that it is commercially irrational to hold the debtor to its contractual obligation. Against the tide of judicial and academic jeremiads clamouring for the extension of the practical benefit
* Law Dept, LSE. I am grateful to Andrew Summers for his comments on a previous draft.
1. [2018] UKSC 24; [2018] BLR 479; [2018] 2 WLR 1603.
2. [1991] 1 QB 1.
3. (1884) 9 App Cas 605.
4. Most notable criticisms have come from: B Coote, “Consideration and Benefit in Fact and in Law” (1991) 3 JCL 23; Mindy Chen-Wishart, “Consideration: Practical Benefit and The Emperor’s New Clothes”, in J Beatson and D Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP, 1997); D Halyk, “Consideration, Practical Benefits and Promissory Estoppel: Enforcement of Contract Modification Promises in Light of Williams v Roffey Brothers” (1991) 55 Saskatchewan L Rev 393.
5. E Peel, Treitel: The Law of Contract, 14th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 2015) (hereafter “Treitel”); J Adams and R Brownsword, “Contract, Consideration and the Critical Path” (1990) 53 MLR 536; MP Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract, 14th edn (OUP, 2001).
6. P Davies, “Varying Contracts” (2016) 75 CLJ 455, 458.
The Last Stand: Foakes v Beer
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