Ameliorative interpretations of one decision in another are not novel.1 The High Court’s recent judgment in Enka v Chubb 2 is a salient example. Amongst other points, Enka contains a reconceptualisation of the guidance in Sulamérica v Enesa 3 on how one identifies the proper law of an arbitration agreement contained in a contractual document which also contains a choice of law clause worded in language that could at least be interpreted as denoting a choice of law for the other contractual provisions. Whilst Moore-Bick LJ in Sulamérica 4 had counselled that a court should discern whether the party had made an “implied choice” of law for the arbitration agreement when it agreed on a general choice of law for the other contractual provisions (the “main contract”), Andrew Baker J in Enka 5 posited (obiter) that the better analysis was to determine whether that choice of law clause itself can be construed as encompassing the arbitration agreement.