Building Law Monthly
THE SCOPE OF THE RULE IN RYLANDS v FLETCHER
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2003] 3 WLR 1467
The House of Lords in
Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council
[2003] UKHL 61, [2003] 3 WLR 1467 has dismissed an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal (on which see our June
2001 issue, pp.7–8) and held that the defendant local authority was not liable to the claimants under the rule in
Rylands v Fletcher
(1866) LR 1 Exch 265; (1868) LR 3 HL 330. The significance of the rule in
Rylands
is that it imposes strict liability on the defendant rather than the usual fault-based liability. The House of Lords affirmed
that
Rylands
remains good law and sought to restate the rule in order to achieve as much certainty and clarity as possible. It may be doubted
whether the five speeches given by their Lordships (which run to 116 paragraphs) fulfil this aim. But they do at least identify
the key ingredients of
Rylands
liability which are as follows: (i) it is a sub-species of nuisance (not negligence), (ii) there must be an escape from the
defendant’s land, (iii) the defendant must have done something which he recognised, or ought to have recognised, as giving
rise to an exceptionally high risk of danger or mischief if there should be an escape, (iv) it is a tort directed to the protection
of interests in land and so damages for personal injuries are not recoverable, (v) liability is, in principle, strict, and
(vi) there are a number of defences to the claim such as Act of God, act of a stranger, statutory authority, etc. The existence
of these defences limits significantly the claim that
Rylands
is a tort of strict liability. But the defences, while significant, do not reduce the rule to one based on fault because the
claimant does not have the burden of proving fault. On the contrary, it is for the defendant to prove the existence of a defence
to the strict liability which will otherwise arise.