Damages-Personal injuries-Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934- Motor accident-Collision on Aug. 4, 1934, between motor cycle combination (in which R was passenger) and defendant's motor car-R seriously injured -Leg amputated on Aug. 6-Death of R on Aug. 8-Claim by administrator of deceased's estate for damages (a) under Fatal Accidents Acts as partial dependant of deceased; (b) under Act of 1934 for the benefit of R's estate (i) in respect of pain and suffering; (ii) in respect of the loss of a leg; (iii) in respect of the shortening of R's reasonable expectation of life (Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354)-Sect. 1: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, on the death of any person after the commencement of this Act all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate. . . . (2) Where a cause of action survives as aforesaid for the benefit of the estate of a deceased person, the damages recoverable for the benefit of the estate of that person: . . . (c) where the death of that person has been caused by the act or omission which gives rise to the cause of action, shall be calculated without reference to any loss or gain to his estate consequent on his
death, except that a sum in respect of funeral expenses may be included"- Assessment of damages by Humphreys, J., under head (a): £300; under (b) (i) and (ii): £500-Damages refused under head (b) (iii) -Appeal by defendant against assessment of damages under heads (b) (i) and (ii)-Cross-appeal by plaintiff against refusal of learned Judge to award damages under head (b) (iii)-Decision of C.A. (Greer, Slesser and Greene, L.JJ.), allowing defendant's appeal, that as the deceased had lost her leg only two days before her death it was impossible in the circumstances to award more than nominal damages, and that therefore, as it was agreed between the parties that the damages attributable to pain and suffering should be £20, the damages awarded under heads (b) (i) and (ii) must be reduced to £22; further, by Slesser and Greene, L.JJ., Greer, L.J., dissenting, dismissing plaintiff's cross-appeal, that the principle laid down in Flint v. Lovell was limited to cases where the injured person was still alive at the date of the action-Appeal by plaintiff.